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Community forest user
groups (CFUGs) in Nepal
generate income over
US$ 10 million annually
through community
forestry. The income
generated is invested in
different development
activities, including pro-
poor programs (PPP). This
paper seeks to understand to what extent CFUG funds are
being invested in PPP, what factors determine whether
investment in PPP is made, and whether the amount of CFUG
income matters for making an investment in PPP. The paper
relies on primary data from 100 CFUGs distributed in 3
different midhill districts of Nepal. A set of questionnaires was
developed and administered to a small group of 100 CFUGs.
The study findings show that PPP is the second major
expenditure of the CFUG funds examined. It suggests that
investment in PPP tends to depend on the amount of CFUG
income. In addition to CFUG income, the chairperson’s age,
the secretary’s exposure, and the number of dalit households
are likely to influence whether investment of CFUG funds in
PPP is made: an older chairperson increases the likelihood
that investment of CFUG funds will be made in PPP, whereas
exposure of the secretary to training and a higher number of
dalit households are likely to lead to less or no investment in
PPP. The paper concludes that higher income leads to a
proportionally higher investment in PPP and suggests that it is
necessary to increase CFUG income to increase investment in
PPP. There is also a need to consider that increasing CFUG
income may lead to overharvesting of forest resources.
Keywords: Community forestry; CFUG funds; pro-poor
programs; CFUG expenditures; dalit households; forest
resources; Nepal.
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Introduction
Nepal’s community forestry is a well-established
management form in the country as it is 3 decades old in
practice. It is a major program of the government in the
forestry sector and is being implemented throughout the
country. More than 14,000 community forest user groups
(CFUGs) currently manage over 1 million hectares of
forestland, involving 1.6 million households (DoF 2008).
An important activity of community forestry in Nepal is
income generation. CFUGs generate income from various
sources such as the sale of forest products, membership
fees, and fines from rule violators. The income generated
is not shared with the government; instead, it accumulates
in the CFUG funds. The annual income of the CFUGs in
Nepal is estimated to be more than US$ 10 million, with
forest products contributing the major share (Kanel and
Niraula 2004). Of the generated income, 25% must be
invested in forest development and maintenance
activities. The remaining money can be used however the
community would like, depending on its needs and the
interests of the community (Gautam et al 2004).
Community forestry broadly refers to the transfer of
national forests to local communities organized in CFUGs
for the protection, management, and utilization of forest
resources. The basic institution that implements
community forestry is a CFUG. CFUGs are legal entities
with autonomy in decision-making; access rules, forest
product prices, mechanisms for allocation of forest
products, user fees, and other important policies are agreed
upon by user members (NORMS 2003 quoted in Kanel and
Niraula 2004). The policy of community forestry today is to
use community forestry as a tool for poverty reduction.
This is considered possible because income generation
allows CFUGs to use accumulated funds in development
activities. Currently, it is a matter of debate whether
investment made by Nepalese CFUGs in development
activities truly benefits the poor, as more funds are being
invested in rural infrastructure such as schools, roads, and
temples and the poor do not directly benefit from such
infrastructure. A frequent question asked is, what projects
are preferred by poor households, and what projects are
attractive for them? Foster and Rosenzweig (2003)
conducted a study in India and argued that roads are pro-
poor, irrigation investments are pro-rich, and schools are
neutral. However, poor households in Nepal may not see
schools as a benefit, since they cannot afford to send their
children to school. Several studies describe membership in
CFUGs and related benefits as favorable to economically
advantaged groups (Graner 1999; Malla 2000; Malla et al
2003; Adhikari et al 2004; Pokharel 2008).
Community forestry does have the potential to
contribute positively to the improvement of rural
livelihoods and poverty alleviation (Fomete and Vermaat
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2001; Brown et al 2002; NPC 2002). In recent years,
Nepal’s government introduced poverty reduction as an
important objective of community forestry. The strategy
is to achieve poverty reduction through a targeted pro-
poor program (PPP) that utilizes CFUG funds. Indeed,
some portion of CFUG funds is expected to go toward
PPP. The PPP is designed to help the poor to improve
their economic condition by supporting activities that
generate income. CFUGs therefore initiate PPPs as
income-generating activities (Koirala et al 2004). PPPs
include activities such as flow of loans, skills-oriented
trainings, and scholarships (Kandel and Subedi 2004;
Koirala et al 2004; Pokharel 2008). Nepal’s Three Year
Interim Development Plan has targeted 35% of the CFUG
funds to be utilized for pro-poor activities (NPC 2007). In
this context, this paper aims to investigate what portion
of CFUG funds is being invested in PPP by the CFUGs. It
also inquires whether there is a close link between CFUG
income and the investment made by the CFUGs in PPP;
however, whether investment made by CFUGs in PPP
really benefits the poor is beyond the scope of this study.
This study focuses on investment made by CFUGs in PPP
rather than on who exactly benefits from the funds.
Study area and data collection
The study covers 3 different midhill districts: Lamjung,
Tanahu, and Kaski in the Western Development Region of
Nepal (Figure 1). These are pioneer districts in the
midhills; community forestry was initiated from its very
beginning in the early 1980s. By September 2005, there
were 3601 CFUGs in the midhills of the Western
Development Region, of which more than one quarter
(28%) fell in three districts (407, 358, and 255 CFUGs in
Kaski, Tanahu, and Lamjung, respectively). The CFUGs in
the study areas were classified into 3 categories
depending on information about fund size available at the
District Forest Offices. The CFUGs with less than NRs
20,000 were not included in this study, as there is a
general tendency in rural areas not to start financial
activity with a common fund until it reaches the size of
NRs 20,000 or more (Pokharel 2008). CFUGs were then
categorized into 3 groups based on the fund size: (1) NRs
20,000–NRs 49,999; (2) NRs 50,000–NRs 99,999; and (3)
NRs 100,000 and above. On average, 50% of the CFUGs in
the study had a fund size of less than NRs 20,000 and 5%
had a fund of NRs 100,000 and above. A total of 100
CFUGs was selected from 3 midhill districts (33 from
Lamjung and Tanahu, and 34 from Kaski). A total of 11
CFUGs from each category in each district was selected
randomly. One additional CFUG from the group of NRs
100,000 and above was selected randomly in Kaski district
to fulfill the required number of CFUGs for this study.
Information was gathered from the CFUGs through a
structured questionnaire. The chairperson of the
executive committee of each CFUG was approached and
asked to invite the secretary and treasurer for a small
group meeting. The questionnaire was administered in
group meetings ranging from 1 to 6 executive members.
Before administering the questionnaire the secretary was
asked to bring official record books to the group meeting,
and the information was recorded accordingly. The mean
group size was 1.67, with a standard deviation of 0.865.
These data were collected from April to November 2006.
Results
CFUGs in three midhill districts in Nepal
The CFUGs in our study districts are quite typical of what is
found in this part of Nepal. Communities in this area
practice subsistence farming; they mostly depend on paddy,
maize, and forests. Forest cover per household is
0.85 hectares in this area, which is slightly higher than the
national average (0.73 hectares) (DoF 2008). About 65% of
the forests in this area are dominated by sal (Shorea robusta),
an important and valuable species for timber. The
remaining 35% of the forests are typical chilaune–catus
(Schima–Castanopsis), a less valuable timber species (Table 1).
The average age of the CFUGs in the study areas is 9.56
(6 2.8) years. This suggests that they are relatively
experienced in managing forest resources. More than one
half of the forest user households belongs to advantaged
groups such as Brahmin, Chhetri, and Newar, followed by
disadvantaged groups such as Gurung, Tamang, Magar, and
dalit (Table 1). Dalit are members of occupational castes.
They are generally disadvantaged in Nepal as compared
with other castes such as Brahmin (Kunwar 2003). Dalit
include groups such as Damai, Kami, and Sarki. In many
cases, Brahmin and disadvantaged groups are also poor in
rural Nepal. The data do not show whether the forest users
from Brahmin and disadvantaged groups are both poor.
Therefore, the study chose dalit only as poor households,
since they generally tend to have a low socioeconomic status.
Community forest user group funds
Income generation is one of the important activities of a
CFUG in Nepal. Most CFUGs generate income from
FIGURE 1 Map of the study districts. (Map by author)
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various sources such as sale of forest products,
membership fees, and fines collected from rule violators.
In order to calculate the income and investment made by
CFUGs, explicit information on investments made by
CFUGs in different activities in the last 5 years was
collected and estimated as income. Annual income is the
total investment made by the CFUGs in the last 5 years
divided by 5 plus annual savings. Annual savings were
calculated as current balance divided by the age of a
CFUG. In the study areas, the average annual income of
the CFUGs was NRs 63,202, and average savings amounted
to NRs 11,629.
CFUG investment in pro-poor programs
The primary issue of interest in this paper is whether
CFUGs are investing their funds in PPP and, if so, what
portion is invested in this manner. In order to understand
CFUG investment, expenditures were broadly classified
into 4 categories as suggested by Kanel and Niraula (2004):
(1) community development activities such as school
buildings, roads, and temples; (2) pro-poor programs such
as flow of loans and self-employment skills-oriented
trainings; (3) forest development works such as
silvicultural operations, awareness campaigns regarding
forestry, and the hiring of a forest guardian; and (4) fees
for running the CFUG institution such as honoraria,
meeting allowances, and money for stationery. Annual
expenditures in the study area were estimated as the total
expenditure in the last 5 years divided by 5. The average
annual expenditure of the CFUGs was NRs 51,574.
The CFUGs invest more than one half of their annual
investment in development activities, followed by PPP,
forest development, and running the CFUG institution.
Table 2 shows the investment activities undertaken by
CFUGs under different categories. The major source of
expenditure of CFUG funds was in community
development activities, suggesting that the CFUGs give
highest priority to community development work and
invest their funds accordingly. Scholars such as Dongol et
al (2002), Acharya (2003), Kanel and Niraula (2004), and
Pokharel (2008) also observed that community
development activities constituted the major source of
expenditure of CFUG funds. The second major source of
expenditure of CFUG funds in the study area was PPP.
The data indicate that CFUGs’ expenditure in PPP went
to flow of loans, self-employment skills-oriented training,
scholarships, and financial support to the poor to buy
medicine and renovate houses. Generally, CFUGs used
different criteria such as food sufficiency from own
farmland and regular income to identify poor households.
In the study area, they defined a poor person as an
individual who owns land that is good enough to feed the
family only for 6 months or less and who works as a wage
laborer or borrows money to feed the family for the
remaining months. In the study area, 38% of the
population was found to be poor (Pokharel 2008).
About two-thirds of the CFUGs in the study area had
undertaken PPP along with various development
activities, whereas the remaining CFUGs (39%) had not
undertaken PPP. In the study area, about one quarter
(22%) of CFUG investment went to PPP, with flow of
loans being the major activity undertaken.
Among the pro-poor activities, flow of loans was very
common: the CFUGs used pro-poor investment
overwhelmingly to give out loans (Figure 2). Only 2% of
pro-poor investment was used for self-employment skills-
oriented training, and 1% was used for scholarships. The
CFUGs had also offered financial support to poor people
TABLE 1 Basic characteristics of the sampled community forest groups (CFUGs; n 5 100).
Basic characteristics Meana)
Percentage of
total in category
Age of CFUGs 9.65 (2.80)
Number of households using the community
forests
131.32 (81.98)
Area of community forests (ha) 83.03 (102.36)
Forest area per household (ha) 0.85 (1.62)
Sal-dominant forests 65.00
Schima–Castanopsis-dominant forests 35.00
Households from advantaged group 53.67
Households from disadvantaged group 28.44
Households from dalit group 17.89
a) Numbers in parentheses indicate standard deviation.
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to buy medicines and to renovate houses in the last 5
years, but this amount was very small. CFUGs’ loan terms
varied from 3 months to 1 year and interest rates varied
from 1% to 2% per month, which was higher than the
bank rate (10% and above per year) and lower than the
local money lenders (2–3% per month). The interest rate
offered by the CFUGs in the area was similar to other
schemes of microcredit through self-help group funds
(Acharya et al 2007). Although the interest rate was higher
than the bank rate, local people preferred to take loans
from the CFUG because it was simpler in terms of official
procedures (eg no collateral was required) and traveling
distance. In the study area, an individual needs to travel
about 2 hours to reach the nearest bank for credit, which
means the person belongs to the 21% of the country’s
population who walk 1–2 hours to reach the bank (NLSS
2004). There was also a decreasing trend among the
households to borrow money from the bank and/or local
money lenders. For example, from 1995–1996 to 2003–
2004 the percentage of money borrowed from the bank
and local money lenders at the national level decreased
from 16% to 15% and from 40% to 26%, respectively
TABLE 2 Annual CFUG investment in different activities.
Serial
number CFUG investment Activities
Average amount invested
Amount (NRs) Percentage
1
Community
development
projects
Schools 5162 10.00
Roads 4976 9.64
Temples 969 1.87
Water reservoirs/irrigation 1530 2.96
Offices/community buildings 6823 13.23
Electricity/mills 2923 5.66
Grants for schools 1608 3.11
Support for teachers’ salaries 4151 8.05
Subtotal 28,142 55
2
Pro-poor activities
Flow of loans 11,268 21.84
Skills-oriented training events 180 0.35
Scholarships for poor students 156 0.30
Subtotal 11,604 22
3
Forest development
activities
Silvicultural operations 1638 3.17
Nursery development 1160 2.24
Awareness campaigns 564 1.09
Forest guardians 5457 10.58
Subtotal 8819 17
4
Running the CFUG
institution
Honoraria/per diems 93 0.18
Meeting allowances 736 1.42
Travel allowances 735 1.42
Stationary 1445 2.80
Subtotal 3009 6
Total annual investment 51,574 100
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(NLSS 2004). Easy access to credit from local institutions
such as CFUGs could be one of the reasons for this
decreasing trend.
Factors influencing CFUG investment in pro-poor programs
Variables such as the amount of CFUG income, the age of
the chairperson, the number of dalit households among
the forest users, and exposure of the secretary to training
were considered to be factors influencing the decision to
invest CFUG funds in PPP; they were therefore
hypothesized as being associated with investing CFUG
funds. The amount of CFUG income was hypothesized to
have an influence on investing in PPP because the CFUGs
with higher income tend to get advice from forest officials
for making investments of CFUG funds. Forest officials
tend to pay attention to the CFUGs that have more
income; they make their visits accordingly, as they think
the CFUGs may misuse the funds. The age of the
chairperson is hypothesized to have an influence on
investing in PPP because older people in rural areas are
often given greater respect and are asked to serve as
customary judges. Older people carry social values,
tradition, culture, and experience and are assets of the
nation (Aryal 2008). An exposure of the secretary to
training and the number of dalit households were also
hypothesized to influence investments in PPP. Indeed, the
secretary is considered an influential position in the
executive committee for making the investment decision.
Moreover, secretaries are younger and better educated
than are the chairpersons. The chairperson and secretary
are active in the management process, particularly with
regard to making decisions related to financial matters
(Banjade et al 2008). As for the number of dalit
households, this factor was considered to influence
investment in PPP because the dalit tend to have low
socioeconomic status and are considered poorer than the
remaining forest users, and therefore a target of PPP.
Regression analysis
In order to understand the factors of influence for
investment of CFUG funds in PPP, multiple regression
analysis was used. The model used to estimate making the
investment of CFUG funds in PPP was as follows:
Yi ~ az b1 | 1z b2 | 2z b3 | 3z b4 | 4z error,
where Yi is the value of dependent variables, the
investment of CFUG funds in PPP; a is the constant, and
bs are the coefficients of the explanatory variables 1 to 4:
CFUG income, chairperson’s age, secretary’s exposure,
and number of dalit households (Table 3). The results of
the multiple regression analysis are presented in Table 4.
The results of the analysis show that the adjusted R2
value is 0.83, suggesting that 83% of variance in the
dependent variable is accounted for by the explanatory
variables. The goodness of fit of the model is high, as it is
significant at the 0.000 level. Among the explanatory
variables, the secretary’s exposure and the number of dalit
households are negatively and significantly correlated
with the investment of CFUG funds in PPP, implying that
a higher exposure of the secretary to training and a
higher number of dalit households using community
forests reduce the likelihood of making an investment of
CFUG funds in PPP. CFUG income and the chairperson’s
age are significantly correlated with the investment of
CFUG funds in PPP, implying that a higher CFUG income
and higher age of the chairperson are likely to increase
the chances of making an investment of CFUG funds in
PPP. The age of the chairperson and the number of dalit
TABLE 3 Definition of explanatory variables.
Variables Explanation
CFUG income Amount of revenue generated by CFUG in a year
Age of
chairperson
Number of years of chairperson since birth
Secretary’s
exposure
Number of training or study tours attended by secretary in a year
Dalit
households
Number of dalit households using community forests
FIGURE 2 Percentage of annual investment in different pro-poor activities.
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households are not significant at the 5% level but are
significant at the 10% level.
Discussion
The second major expenditure of CFUG funds in the
study area was found to be PPP, which is a surprising
finding. One recent study shows that only 3% of CFUGs’
expenditures are directed to PPP (Kanel and Niraula
2004). The present findings suggest that there was a big
leap in investment made by CFUGs in PPP. The reason
could be that the concept of PPP in community forestry
emerged once community forestry developed a vision of
poverty reduction in 1998. Some forestry projects
initiated PPPs in 1999–2000, but this number increased
only gradually. This could be one reason for the big leap
in CFUG expenditure in PPP observed here. The
significant increment in investment of CFUG funds in
PPP indicates that the CFUGs are considering pro-poor
programs as one major activity.
The analysis suggests that CFUG income is highly
correlated with PPP investment. The data show that the
CFUGs with higher income are more likely to make an
investment in PPP. One reason could be that they receive
suggestions and technical support from outsiders such as
forest officials. Forest officials are often in contact with
CFUG officials who have higher income, as there are
chances that large funds may be misused. Forest officials
interact with CFUGs regularly and make suggestions
regarding investments in PPP. Since the Department of
Forests initiated PPPs, it presents PPP investment as
mandatory and encourages the CFUGs to invest a major
part of their income in PPP. The other reason could be
that many CFUGs in the study area feel that their income
is government money and if they do not follow the
officials’ suggestions, the money will be taken back.
The age of the chairperson is also correlated with
investment of CFUG funds in PPP, in the sense that an
older chairperson is more likely to suggest investing
CFUG funds in PPP. Indeed, there is a culture of
respecting elderly people in rural areas, and they often
serve as customary judges to resolve village conflicts.
Another tradition in rural areas is to offer the post of
chairperson in the executive committee to relatively old
persons. Since elderly people carry experience,
knowledge, culture, and social values, they consider all
these aspects while making a decision, and the decision
they make is considered to be unbiased. As elderly people,
they try to maintain their reputation; moreover, as village
representatives, they may see the problems of the poor as
a community concern, not just the concern of an
individual. Once they see the problems of the poor as a
community concern, they consider PPP as a priority and
accordingly suggest investing CFUG funds. There are 9
cases in the study areas where CFUGs have made more
than 50% annual investment in PPP. When analyzed, the
age of the chairperson in these CFUGs was 50 years old
and above.
By contrast, the data indicate that when a secretary’s
exposure to training is greater, there is less investment of
CFUG funds in PPP. The post of secretary in the
committee is considered an important one, as it
influences CFUG decisions. The District Forest Offices of
the DoF often organize trainings on themes such as
silvicultural operations and lead study tours in the areas
where infrastructural activities are being conducted by
the CFUGs and where forests are effectively managed.
Generally, organizers tend to invite either the chairperson
or the secretary for the training and study tours. The
executive committee encourages the secretaries to
participate in such tours as they are younger and better
educated. In the study areas, the average age of a
chairperson is 52 years, while that of a secretary is 42.
Similarly, the average number of school years attended by
chairpersons is 7 years, while for secretaries it is 10 years.
Once the secretary gets exposure to training, he or she is
likely to propose trying new activities with CFUG funds;
the proposed idea is likely to be accepted by the committee
TABLE 4 Variables that determine whether investment of CFUG funds is made in pro-poor programs.
Variables Coefficienta) P value
Constant 28807.95 (6638.34) 0.18
CFUG income 0.910 (0.01) 0.00
Age of chairperson 0.070 (124.83) 0.10
Exposure of secretary 20.084 (679.62) 0.04
Dalit households 20.072 (47.64) 0.09
F value = 118.89; P , 0.000
R2 = 0.83
Adjusted R2 = 0.82
a) Numbers in parentheses indicate standard error (SD).
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because the secretary is a respected person. Getting funds
for a new activity in the field of rural infrastructural
development and effective forest management means
reducing the chances of investing CFUG funds in other
activities such as PPP. Recently, the DoF has initiated
training and study tours focusing on the enhancement of
pro-poor activities to implement PPP effectively.
Secretaries’ exposure to such training is likely to have a
positive influence on investments in PPP.
The data also indicate that the higher the number of
dalit households using community forests, the more
unlikely it is that CFUGs will invest in PPP. This is a
surprising finding that can be explained in the following
manner. An effective implementation of PPP requires
collective action, and increasing group size is likely to
decrease the perspective for successful collective action.
Olson (1965) and many scholars argue that larger
community size is less likely to lead to collective action.
Flow of loans is a major activity undertaken by CFUGs in
PPP. Generally, CFUGs allocate a part of CFUG funds for
loans and distribute them accordingly. As the poorer dalit
expect loans, for example, and fulfilling the needs of a
larger number of dalit households at the same time is not
possible due to the limited funds, the discrepancy in loan
distribution makes the poor dissatisfied, leading the
program to ineffectiveness. Another explanation is that
poor households may invest loaned money in other
activities such as consumable goods rather in than income
generation, as they face hand-to-mouth issues. Such
investment puts poor people in the difficult position of
having to pay back loans in time. As a result, they have
limited access to loans, diverting investment into other
activities. The poor sections of the CFUGs thus have
limited access to the group’s income (Bhattarai and
Dhungana 2005).
Conclusions
Community forestry has received considerable attention
in recent years as a potential tool in achieving the goal of
poverty reduction. This study analyzes the investment of
CFUG funds in PPP in an empirical setting. The study
findings clearly underscore the importance of CFUG
income for investing in PPP. Factors contributing to
variation of CFUG fund investment in PPP are the volume
of CFUG income, the age of the chairperson, the degree
of the secretary’s exposure to training, and the number of
dalit households using community forests. The first two
factors have a positive influence on PPP investment,
whereas the latter two have a negative influence. Based on
the analysis, this study argues that higher income tends to
lead to a proportionally higher investment in PPP,
implying that CFUGs require increasing their income to
increase their investment in PPP. However, encouraging
the CFUGs to increase their income may lead to
overharvesting, as forest products are the main source of
income. Overharvesting of forests leads to unsustainable
development, as it causes environmental degradation. If
the post of chairperson is held by relatively older people,
this is likely to increase investment of CFUG funds in PPP.
Similarly, increasing the secretary’s exposure to pro-
poor-directed activities would have a positive effect on
investment in PPP.
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